By Laura Tamayo
Since its establishment over two decades ago, the International Criminal Court () has sought to hold people accountable for some of humanity���s worst crimes. But the Court���s work raises profound questions: How can one court prosecute immense crimes around a world still largely organized around sovereign states?
Visiting Professor , at the CUNYSchool of Law and director of its Equality and Justice Practice Clinic, studies international legal institutions��� relationships to domestic systems. Before arriving at 勛圖弝け, he advocated for human rights at international policy organizations. He also co-edited (2015).
The Rome Statute established the ICC in 1998, following decades of efforts to create a permanent, standing court. The tribunals following conflicts in Rwanda and the Balkans added new urgency to that work.
The ICC assumed jurisdiction over four international atrocities: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. With this huge remit, the ICC operates as an independent judicial body ��� a difficult task in an international system in which states retain enormous powers. The Court relies on their cooperation.
���Generally, our entire international system of law is premised on state consent,��� says De Vos. ���There is a regime of cooperation that is meant to make the Court work.���
The ICC has faced several implementation problems, from selective participation to a global political landscape that has grown increasingly contested. Several major powers ��� including the Unites States, Russia, China, India, and Israel ��� are not parties to the Rome Statute. But non-membership does not necessarily mean a country���s nationals are beyond the ICC���s jurisdiction. The ICC can investigate crimes committed on the territory of party state, regardless of the accused���s nationality.
The U.S. government actively works to challenge the ICC, according to De Vos. In February 2025, President Donald Trump issued Executive Order 14203, authorizing sanctions against ICC officials and others. It claims they engaged in the ICC���s
Crimes in illustrate another challenge. Even where the Court has jurisdiction, decisions about when to deploy its limited investigative and prosecutorial resources can generate significant controversy.
Many hoped that the ICC���s mission could transcend politics, but international criminal justice has always operated within a broader geopolitical environment. Today���s landscape might pose the Court���s greatest threat yet. The cooperative promise of the post-Cold War order is increasingly challenged by rising nationalism and aggressive claims to sovereignty.
In his book, (2020), De Vos studies a different dimension of the ICC���s relationship with states. He asks how the Court���s interventions affected domestic accountability efforts within those countries. This dynamic is referred to as ���complementarity��� ��� how the Rome Statute allocates responsibility between the ICC and national legal systems. The Court intended to act when domestic systems are unwilling or unable to genuinely investigate or prosecute relevant crimes.
For De Vos, this raises a broader question: Can international intervention strengthen domestic accountability rather than simply substitute it?
���Beyond just trying to investigate and prosecute certain cases, can the ICC actually prompt domestic prosecutors, domestic judges, domestic investigations in a way that ultimately makes a global court unnecessary, because states are taking care of it themselves?��� De Vos asks.
There is not yet an answer. Currently, we need systems like the ICC more than ever. De Vos��� research examines alternative arrangements for investigating atrocity crimes and other forms of wrongdoing like corruption. He explores different ways international and national actors can work together to advance accountability.
De Vos looks at the and the UN General Assembly-established . Neither institution is an international court. For De Vos, that is precisely the point. Both offer models for how international bodies can support domestic efforts towards justice.
Studying these histories asks a larger question: What kinds of institutions can best pursue accountability in a rapidly changing world, where neither international courts nor states can reliably do the work alone?
